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ABSTRACT 
Previous research shows that some proportion of people interrogated confess, regardless of 
actual guilt.  It has also been shown that the camera perspective from which an interrogation is 
videotaped influences later judgments of voluntariness and guilt, as well as sentencing 
recommendations.  The present research extends the understanding of this phenomenon of false 
confessions and the camera perspective bias.  Ecologically valid videotaped true/false 
confessions and denials were obtained in Experiment 1.  The proportions of guilt participants and 
participants that confessed to cheating were found to be smaller in Experiment 1 than those in 
previous research.  Participants in Experiment 2 viewed the videotapes from the first experiment 
from a suspect-focused, interrogator-focused, or equal-focused camera perspective and judged 
the suspects’ guilt as well as made attributions of responsibility for the suspects’ statements.  
Results from the second experiment did not show a camera perspective bias in judgments of 
guilt; however, camera perspective did influence the type and amount of attributions made.  
Implications of these findings are discussed.  
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  1 
Research indicates that between 40% and 76% of suspects who are interrogated by the 
police confess (Gudjonsson, 2003).  While most of these confessions are given by guilty 
individuals (i.e., true confessions), some are given by those who are innocent (i.e., false 
confessions).  The exact prevalence of false confessions is currently unknown; however, to date 
there have been 273 convictions overturned due to DNA evidence in the United States history 
(Innocence Project, 2011), of which 66 of the convictions involved a defendant who falsely 
confessed to the crime.  In fact, false confessions are currently considered to be one of the 
leading causes of wrongful convictions of innocent people (Klaver, Lee, & Rose, 2008).  
Although it may seem inconceivable that someone would confess to a crime they did not 
commit, there are several documented cases in which this happened.  Furthermore, previous 
research has demonstrated that it is possible to obtain a false confession in a laboratory setting as 
well (e.g., Kassin & Keichel, 1996; Lassiter, Clark, Ware, Schmidt, & Geers, manuscript in 
preparation (as cited in Snyder, Lassiter, Lindberg & Pinegar, 2009); Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). 
False confessions are problematic because jurors are sometimes presented with these 
confessions and must decide whether or not the confession is valid.  Whether jurors believe the 
confession is genuine likely depends on how they attribute the defendant’s behavior during the 
confession (i.e., explain the causes of the suspect confessing).  Jurors may see the confession as a 
reflection of an internal state of guilt or as a result of situational pressure to confess. 
Documented Cases of False Confessions 
The phenomenon of false confessions can be investigated outside of the laboratory by 
examining real-world documented cases where someone confessed to committing a crime and 
was later proven innocent. There are hundreds of documented cases of false confessions 
   2
    
throughout history.  For example, in January of 1998 Richard Tuite, a felon and a drifter 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, snuck into 12-year-old Stephanie Crowe’s bedroom and stabbed 
her to death while her family slept.  Tuite had been seen in the Crowe’s neighborhood on the 
night of the murder asking around about a girl.  Police questioned Tuite and confiscated his 
clothes, but released him due to a lack of evidence and because they did not think he was capable 
of getting into the Crowe’s house without anyone knowing.  Soon after the murder, Stephanie’s 
14-year-old brother, Michael Crowe, became a person of interest to police when he appeared to 
be distant and distracted after his sister’s body was discovered (Leung, 2009).  Michael 
confessed to the murder of his little sister after being interrogated for two days about the murder 
without his parents or a lawyer present.  The interrogation was videotaped, documenting Michael 
making comments such as “I’m only saying this because it’s what you want to hear” (Leung, 
2009).  Two of Michael’s friends became suspects as well and were also interrogated for several 
hours.  One of Michael’s friends, Aaron Houser, confessed to the murder.  Michael’s second 
friend, Josh Treadway, did not confess but gave a “hypothetical” and incriminating account of 
the murder (Leung). 
All three of the young boys later claimed they were coerced into confessing and recanted 
their statements.  A judge later deemed Michael and Aaron’s confessions to be coerced and 
threw the confessions out of evidence, as well as part of Josh’s statements. Treadway’s public 
defender discovered that not all of Tuite’s clothes had been tested for DNA and demanded the 
testing be done. After six months of the boys being incarcerated, DNA testing linked Richard 
Tuite to Stephanie Crowe’s blood and the charges against the three boys were dropped (Leung, 
2009). 
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The false confession of Michael Crow is just one of numerous cases in which someone 
confessed to committing a crime they did not commit.  For example, in 1947 more than 50 
people confessed to the brutal torture, murder, and dismemberment of Elizabeth Short, the 
actress from the movie Black Dahlia (Kassin et al., 2010).  Another example of such a situation 
can be found in the 1989 Central Park jogger case where five teenagers confessed to rape and 
murder and were convicted and sent to prison, only to be exonerated 13 years later by DNA 
evidence (Drizin & Leo, 2004).  Probably one of the most baffling examples of a case involving 
false confessions is that of Henry Lee Lucas, who falsely confessed to hundreds of unsolved 
murders in Texas in 1980, making him the person to falsely confess to the most crimes in history 
(Kassin et al., 2010).  All of these cases demonstrate that false confessions do occur in real life 
and that they can have serious repercussions.  
Empirical Evidence for the Existence of False Confessions 
Kassin and Keichel (1996) designed the first and, until recently, only paradigm for 
eliciting false confessions in a laboratory setting.  In their ‘alt’ key paradigm, participants typed 
letters on a keyboard (either at a slow or fast pace) as the experimenter read the letters out loud.  
Prior to the start of the session, participants were told that there was a problem with the computer 
program and if they hit the ‘alt’ key the computer would crash, resulting in all of the data for the 
experiment being lost.  One minute into the experiment the computer “unexpectedly” crashed.  
Participants were all truly innocent and all initially denied hitting the ‘alt’ key.  However, across 
conditions 69% of the participants confessed to hitting the forbidden key when interrogated, and 
signed a confession admitting to doing so.  This study has been replicated and expanded upon 
multiple times (e.g., Forrest, Wadkins, & Larson, 2006; Horselenberg, Merckelbach & Josephs, 
2003; Lassiter et al., manuscript in preparation (as cited in Snyder et al., 2009); Redlich & 
   4
    
Goodman, 2003) and although the findings may be counterintuitive, they represent a reliable 
phenomenon. 
Much of the research on confessions and interrogations is conducted in order to discover 
the best ways to elicit high rates of true confessions while minimizing the rates of false 
confessions (Russano et al., 2005).  Kassin and Keichel’s (1996) ‘alt’ key paradigm was a 
breakthrough in false confession research; however, the paradigm lacks ecological value due to 
the fact that all participants are innocent, therefore eliminating the possibility for participants to 
truly confess.  In order to accurately understand when and why people falsely confess, one must 
be able to examine the ratio of true confessions to false confessions (Russano et al., 2005).   
To overcome the limitations of the ‘alt’ key paradigm, Russano et al. (2005) developed a 
false confession paradigm that made it possible to study both true and false confessions in a more 
controlled environment.  Participants (all male) were seated in a room with a female confederate 
to work on solving written problems.  The participant and confederate were informed that they 
would be working on some problems together but that there were other problems they were 
required to work on independently.  It was made clear which problems were to be worked on 
separately and which problems they should work on together.  The experimenter then left the 
room for approximately 20 minutes.  In the innocent condition, the participant and the 
confederate worked independently when instructed to do so.  In the guilty condition, the 
confederate asked the participant for help on a problem that they were instructed to work on 
independently.  In nearly all cases the actual participant provided the confederate with help on 
the problem they were instructed to work on independently.  The experimenter, blind to which 
condition the participant was in, returned to the room, collected the responses, and again left the 
room.  After a period of five minutes the experimenter returned and, regardless of the condition, 
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said that he/she noticed the answers to the independent questions were very similar and that 
he/she believed that the two had collaborated on their answers.  The experimenter then separated 
the participant from the confederate and attempted to gain a written confession from the 
participant.  Interrogation techniques and the offer of a “deal” were varied.  Across experiments 
the rate of true confessions ranged from about 64% to 82% and from 17% to 25% for false 
confessions.  Using minimization tactics (i.e., strategies minimizing the seriousness and the 
consequences of the crime) and offering leniency led to increased rates of both true and false 
confessions compared to using no tactic, offering only a deal, or using only minimization 
(Russano et al., 2005).   
Why Innocent People Confess 
Situational Factors 
Several police interrogation tactics are used to elicit a confession in applied settings; 
however, these tactics sometimes lead to eliciting a false confession.  Kassin (1997) describes 
three types of false confessions: the voluntary confession, the coerced-compliant confession, and 
the coerced-internalized confession.  A voluntary confession occurs in the absence of any 
obvious external pressure (e.g., to cover for one’s child).  On the other hand, a coerced-compliant 
confession is when an individual confesses to the crime in order to escape a stressful situation, 
such as being interrogated for a long period of time.  Finally, a coerced-internalized confession 
occurs when the suspect becomes convinced, at least for that moment, that he/she actually 
committed the crime.  For example, if a suspect had an alcoholic blackout during the time of the 
crime they were accused of committing, and truly could not remember where they were or what 
they did, the interrogator may be able to convince the suspect they committed the crime and 
simply do not remember doing so.  
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Eight interrogation tactics have been identified that seem to routinely appear in cases of 
coerced-internalized confessions (Ofshe, 1989).  Four of these tactics appear to be present in all 
cases of coerced-internalized confessions: the interrogator repeatedly states their certainty in the 
suspect’s guilt; isolates the suspect from information and social support that undermines the 
interrogator’s position; utilizes lengthy interrogations with high emotional intensity; and 
develops a post-hoc explanation to account for why the suspect may not remember committing 
the crime.  Additionally, four more tactics used during interrogations are routinely seen in some, 
but not all, cases of coerced-internalized confessions.  These tactics include: repeatedly claiming 
the authorities have scientific evidence that proves the suspect’s guilt; repeatedly bringing up any 
previous criminal records to decrease their confidence about correctly recalling the crime; simply 
demanding the suspect accept the post-hoc explanation; and use of tactics designed to induce fear 
that if the suspect does not confess they will receive the most severe of the possible punishments 
for the crime. 
An additional and important situational factor that affects whether a suspect confesses is 
the environment in which they are being interrogated.  In most interrogations an authority figure 
claims to have insight and experience about what happened during the crime, and why the 
suspect may have committed the crime (Kassin, 1997).  Furthermore, interrogations are usually 
in private, small rooms with no windows and are socially isolated where the suspect cannot get 
external cues about the reality of the situation (Kassin, 1997). 
Some interrogators employ tactics known as minimization and maximization to obtain a 
confession (Kassin, 2008).  During minimization, the interrogator reduces the seriousness of the 
crime by expressing sympathy for the suspect and offering moral justification for them 
committing the crime.  For example, an interrogator may say they understand why the suspect 
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would murder a child rapist, no one would think they were a bad person, and in fact the world is 
better off with one less child rapist.  Using minimization tactics often leads the suspect to 
confess, believing they will receive some sort of leniency despite no explicit promises from the 
interrogator (Kassin & McNall, 1991).  Russano et al. (2005) found that using minimization 
tactics not only increased true confessions from guilty participants but it also increased false 
confessions from innocent participants, which suggests this tactic may not be appropriate. 
Maximization tactics include things like presenting false evidence, using intimidation, 
and exaggerating the seriousness of the charge (Kassin, 2008).  Kassin and Keichel (1996) 
demonstrated how using maximization tactics (in this case presentation of a false witness) could 
produce false confessions.  Participants in the ‘alt’ key paradigm typed at a slow or fast pace.  
After the computer crashed, the experimenter accused the participant of pressing the forbidden 
key, and attempted to obtain a confession.  For some participants, a confederate told the 
experimenter that she saw the participant hit the ‘alt’ key.  It was found that in the fast 
pace/witness condition (maximization) participants signed a written confession 100% of the 
time.  
High rates of false confessions were found in another study when false evidence from an 
authority figure was presented and an immediate negative consequence of monetary loss was 
added (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 2003).  The results from these studies suggest 
that the social context in which a suspect is questioned can play a large role in whether or not 
they decide to confess.   
Dispositional Factors 
Internal factors may also help account for some false confessions.  For example, Drizin 
and Leo (2004) found that juveniles account for a disproportionate percent of people who 
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confess.  Additionally, more than 90% of juveniles the police intend to question waive their 
Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966) to remain silent and contact an attorney (Kassin, 
2008).  In another study, Redlich and Goodman (2003) found that younger participants (ages 12-
13 and 15-16) were more likely to sign a false confession than college students, with the 15 and 
16 year olds most influenced when false evidence was presented.  This study also demonstrated 
that participants who gave in to leading questions were more likely to falsely confess.  
 Kassin (1991) argued that memory is malleable by virtue of youth, naiveté, low 
intelligence, stress/fatigue (e.g., length of detention), and/or substance use, thus increasing the 
risk of falsely confessing.  Kassin reported that those in a state of uncertainty are likely to falsely 
confess, create additional details consistent with their new “memory”, and internalize the 
confession.  It is sometimes the case that a confession is the only evidence against a defendant.  
Therefore, in the absence of corroborating evidence, a confession may be taken as sufficient to 
convict the person.   
Furthermore, individual differences, such as self-esteem, self-confidence, and 
susceptibility to guilt, may interact with contextual factors (e.g., a closed social interaction) and 
interpersonal pressure (e.g., from an interrogator), leading some individuals to make false 
confessions (Gudjonsson, 1992).  For example, Forrest, Wadkins, and Larson (2006) used the 
‘alt’ key paradigm to investigate the roles of gender, stress, and personality on false confessions.  
Females were more likely to falsely confess and internalize than males.  However, males 
internalized more in stressful (vs. non-stressful) conditions.  Additionally, false confessions were 
related to increased susceptibility to leading questions and internalization was related to 
personality variables such as external locus of control, anxiety, and authoritarianism (Klaver, 
2008).  
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Judging the Veracity of Statements 
Determining the validity of a confession becomes an issue for the courts when it comes to 
jurors and judges, because they must assign the appropriate weight to a confession (Lassiter, 
Diamond, Schmidt & Elek, 2007).  In Jackson v. Denno (1964) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that a criminal defendant has the right to a pretrial hearing to determine whether the confession 
they gave was voluntary.  If the judge decides the confession was in fact voluntary it is then 
introduced at trial.  Even if the confession is admitted for the jury to hear, the defendant may still 
claim that the confession was coerced.  In this case the jury must decide whether they believe the 
confession was voluntary.   
Additionally, it is sometimes the case that a confession is ruled inadmissible during the 
pretrial hearing but is improperly mentioned to the jury (e.g., statements from a police officer 
testifying); (Henkel, 2008).  If this were to happen the judge would likely instruct the jury to 
disregard the information about the defendant’s confession, but it is sometimes the case that the 
judge fails to explain the reason the confession was found to be inadmissible (Kassin & Sukel, 
1997).  Research has shown that mock jurors are often unable to disregard such confession 
evidence when deciding on a verdict, regardless of specific instructions to do so (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1980).  In fact, the simple presence of a confession can increase the rate of guilty 
verdicts (Kassin & Sukel, 1997).  Because disregarding confession evidence is not a simple task, 
it is not surprising that Drizin and Leo (2004) found that juries convicted 81% of people who 
falsely confessed to a crime and later plead not guilty at trial. 
It is not a simple task to distinguish truth from deception.  When jurors decide whether a 
confession is true or false they take on this difficult task.  Previous research has produced mixed 
findings on deception detection accuracy.  Some research suggests that some people are able to 
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accurately detect deception above chance (e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991); however, the 
majority of the literature suggests that this is not the case (for a review, see Vrij, 2000).  In one 
study, members of law enforcement, psychiatrists, special interest groups, and college students 
viewed a video of a woman and attempted to determine whether she was lying or telling the truth 
(Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991).   All participants watched a video of the women describing 
positive feelings about a “nature” video she was watching; however, for half the participants this 
description was given while the woman was actually watching a gruesome video.  Only law 
enforcement personnel were able to accurately detect when the woman was lying above chance 
levels and over half of them were more than 70% accurate. 
When a confession goes before a jury it is laypersons who must be able to accurately 
determine the veracity of the confession.  In line with Ekman and O’Sullivan’s (1991) findings, 
another study by Kassin, Meissner, and Norwick (2005) demonstrated that laypeople, in general, 
are unable to detect deception above chance levels.  Kassin et al. (2005) used videotapes of male 
prison inmates making true confessions about their crimes and making false confessions for 
crimes they did not commit.  Later, police investigators and laypeople judged the veracity of the 
confessions, producing an overall accuracy rate of 54%, which did not differ significantly from 
chance. 
 When it comes to judging the veracity of a person’s statements, people tend to judge 
statements as truthful irrespective of actual statement veracity (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 
1999).  In tasks where participants judge others’ deception, the tendency to judge statements as 
truthful is associated with increased accuracy (Levine et al., 1999).  For example, Vrij (2000) 
conducted a review of lay observers’ deception detection accuracy and found that 67% of 
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truthful statements were accurately identified, whereas only 44% of deceptive statements were 
accurately identified. 
Two explanations have been offered to account for this truth bias.  First, a form of the 
availability heuristic posits that because people encounter more truthful messages on a day-to-
day basis, they are more likely to assume messages are truthful in general (O’Sullivan, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1988).  Second, it is possible this truth bias is a result of the difficulties of cognitive 
processing (McCornack, 1997).  Previous research has demonstrated that both true and false 
information is initially represented as truthful, and information deemed false must be carefully 
re-assessed and documented as false (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990).  Due to the difficulty in 
re-analyzing this incoming information, errors sometimes occur, leading observers to perceive 
false statements as truthful statements (Gilbert et al., 1990).  These previous findings 
demonstrate how damning confession evidence can be in criminal trials. 
Attributions of Behavior 
 Whether jurors believe a confession is authentic likely depends on how they attribute the 
defendant’s behavior during the confession.  Jurors may see the confession as a reflection of an 
internal state of guilt or as a result of situational pressure to confess.  Previous research has 
demonstrated that attributions of responsibility can be influenced by which person involved in 
the interaction is made more salient, a phenomenon known as the illusory causation (e.g., Taylor 
& Fiske, 1975; McArthur & Ginsberg, 1981).  Taylor and Fiske (1975) conducted the first 
systematic demonstration of illusory causation in the social domain by having observers view an 
informal conversation between two people.  The salience of each person was manipulated by 
where they sat in the room, such that they faced the observer or did not face the observer.  It was 
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found that observers attributed greater causality to whichever person the observer happened to be 
facing.  
If attributions of responsibility are greatly influenced by what is made more salient, 
manipulating salience should affect how behavior is interpreted.  Storms (1973) had two actors 
engage in a short “get to know one another” conversation, while two observers watched.  The 
first two conditions (no video replay and video replay of the original orientation) demonstrated 
that actors made more situational attributions than observers did.   However, when actors were 
shown videotapes of themselves from an observer’s perspective, actors made more dispositional 
(i.e., internal) attributions than observers did.  These findings suggest that self-observation 
increases an individual’s dispositional attributions of their behavior, and that they interpret their 
behavior more in line with observers’ interpretations.  
Additionally, previous research has demonstrated the fundamental attribution error; that 
is, people tend to underestimate the role of situational factors and overestimate dispositional 
factors that may cause an actor’s outcomes and actions (Ross, 1977).  Ross had one participant 
generate difficult general knowledge questions for a quiz game for another participant to answer, 
based on their personal knowledge.  After the game participants rated their general knowledge 
and their partner’s general knowledge compared to an average Stanford University student.  It 
was found that both the questioners and the answerers rated the questioners as superior to the 
answerers.  In a second study the same bias was found as in the first study when uninvolved 
observers watched a close simulation of the interaction that went on in the first experiment.  
However, this bias was stronger for the answerers and uninvolved observers than for the 
questioners.   
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The fundamental attribution error has been demonstrated in several studies across 
multiple domains.  For example, Jones and Harris (1967) found listeners assumed that speakers’ 
pro-Castro comments reflected their personal opinions, despite knowing the speaker was obeying 
the instructions from the experimenter in a “no-choice” condition.  In another study, participants 
who personally engaged in an exact reenactment of the classic Milgram (1963) study 
consistently underestimated how much electric shock participants in the original study would 
administer (Bierbrauer, 1973).  Participants attributed the original participants’ obedience to 
personal dispositions as opposed the situational influences like the ones they had just 
experienced themselves.  Accordingly, social roles appear to be an important situational force 
that can bias the inferences observers make about actors based on these performances.   
Both illusory causation and the fundamental attribution error have important implications 
when it comes to making accurate social judgments outside the laboratory as well.  For example, 
when a suspect is taken into police custody and questioned, the interrogator has more control 
over the style, content, and duration of the interrogation than the suspect.  This control facilitates 
the interrogator’s display of knowledge, skill, and insight.  In any interpersonal encounter, each 
individual’s social role can affect a perceiver’s social judgments about the individual.  In order to 
make accurate social judgments one must be able to recognize, and correct for, the influences 
that an individual’s social role can have on such judgments (Ross, 1977; Gilbert et al., 1990).  
Accordingly, it is likely that evaluations of the validity of confessions are influenced by whoever 
is made more salient during the interrogation.  That is, during a videotaped interrogation, 
whether the camera is focused on the suspect, interrogator, or both, is likely to affect one’s 
perception of the validity of the confession. 
Videotaping Interrogations 
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Documentation of custodial interrogations is beginning to expand beyond written reports 
and audiotaped recordings to videotaped recordings of the interrogations; however, this is not 
always the case.  Videotaping an interrogation is not mandatory in all legal arenas and is actually 
discouraged in some (Geller, 1993).  Therefore, in these cases, confession evidence is presented 
in the form of a written confession with little documentation of how the confession was obtained 
(Lassiter, Munhall, Geers, Weiland, & Handley, 2001).   
In the United States, videotaped interrogations most often take place only for serious 
crimes such as felony cases or cases of violence.  Advocates of videotaping interrogations argue 
that doing so will reduce coercive tactics used by police, as well as provide a complete and well-
documented record of the interrogation (Geller, 1993).  Others (Lassiter et al., 2001) argue that 
videotaping confessions and interrogations allows judges and jurors to make objective and 
accurate decisions as to the validity of the confession. 
It is commonly thought that having an interrogation and confession on videotape would 
allow for more accurate evaluations of the validity of the confession (Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  
However, the ability to distinguish a false confession from a true confession may depend partly 
on how the videotaped confession is presented to the jury.  
When an interrogation is videotaped, the camera is usually focused on the suspect, likely 
in order to directly hear and see what the suspect is doing to assess the veracity of the statement 
(Kassin, 1997).  However, this approach excludes many of the situational influences that may 
affect the validity of a confession.  This becomes an issue because judgments of whether a 
suspect voluntarily confessed can be influenced by the angle in which the confession is 
videotaped (Lassiter et al., 2001). 
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Lassiter and Irvine (1986) demonstrated the phenomenon of illusory causation by 
showing participants videotaped interrogations where either the suspect or the interrogator was 
the focus of the camera.  Participants rated voluntariness of confessions highest in the suspect-
focused perspective and lowest in the interrogator-focused perspective.  Other studies have found 
the camera perspective to influence both judgments of guilt and sentencing recommendations as 
well (Lassiter et al., 2002; Lassiter, Beers, Geers & Munhall, 2003; Lassiter, Diamond, Schmidt 
& Elek, 2007).  
Lassiter et al. (2003) had participants view the videotaped interrogation-confession of 
Peter Reilly, a man who was wrongfully convicted for the manslaughter of his mother based on 
his coerced confession.  Later it was proven that Reilly could not have committed the crime and 
his conviction was overturned.  After viewing the videotaped interrogation, participants were 
more accurate in judging Reilly’s innocence and in judging that his confession was coerced when 
they viewed the interrogator-focused version, compared to the suspect-focused or equal-focused 
(i.e., profile view of both the suspect and interrogator from the waist up) versions.  Therefore, it 
appears that participants were able to accurately judge the confession when the situational factors 
surrounding the confession were made salient. 
With these findings in mind, researchers have begun investigating whether there is a way 
to videotape interrogations that leads to more accurate detection of deception and falsity in 
confessions.  For example, Snyder et al. (2009) proposed that there might be a better way to 
videotape interrogations that eliminates the camera perspective bias.  Although the equal-focus 
camera perspective produces relatively unbiased evaluations, it does not allow for a full-face 
view of the suspect, which some find helpful when making judgments about the voluntariness 
and validity of a confession.  Synder et al. examined an alternative method of videotaping 
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interrogations by splicing the suspect-focused and interrogator-focused perspective and created a 
dual-camera perspective.  For their dual-camera perspective the authors used a split screen video 
where a full-face view of the suspect and a full-face view of the interrogator was presented, thus 
creating an equal-focus situation.  The dual-camera perspective produced unbiased evaluations of 
guilt and therefore the authors suggest it may be a viable alternative to the equal-focus 
perspective.  However, in a follow up study, Snyder et al. found that the dual-camera perspective 
was no better than the suspect-focused perspective with regard to distinguishing between true 
and false confessions.  How the camera perspective impacts judgments of the validity of a 
confession during an interrogation had yet to be fully answered. 
Lassiter et al. (manuscript in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 2009) provided a 
partial answer to how the perspective of an interrogation-confession can affect participants’ 
accuracy when distinguishing between true and false confessions.  In this study, actual true and 
false confessions were obtained using a modified version of Kassin and Keichel’s (1996) ‘alt’ 
key paradigm.  A participant and a confederate worked together on a computer task that appeared 
to crash during the experiment.  The computer “crash” was either “caused” by the participant (all 
males) or by the confederate (all females) hitting the ‘alt’ key.  In one condition the female 
confederate urged the male participant to hit the specified key, in the other condition she pleaded 
with him not to turn her in for hitting the key because she was scared of it affecting whether she 
received a research position with the faculty member associated with the experiment.   
Confessions were videotaped in a suspect-focused, interrogator-focused, or equal-focused 
manner, as well as documented via audiotape and transcription.  Two true and two false 
confessions were shown to a new group of participants who rated the truthfulness of the 
confessions.  Participants’ truthfulness ratings of the two false confessions were subtracted from 
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their ratings of the two true confessions.  It was found that in the interrogator-focused condition 
participants had greater accuracy than the equal-focused condition, which was followed by the 
suspect-focused condition. 
The findings provided by Lassiter et al. (manuscript in preparation, as cited in Snyder et 
al., 2009) currently tell us the most about how the camera perspective affects judgments of the 
validity of confessions.  That being said, several considerations must be made when evaluating 
these findings.  First, the use of all male participants and all female confederates reduces the 
ability to generalize the authors’ findings to real world confessions.  The gender difference 
between the participant and the confederate may have impacted the participant’s willingness to 
confess.  It is possible that the male participants found it easier to build rapport with the female 
confederates, compared to if the confederates had been male.  The fact that the female 
confederates either urged the male participants to hit the forbidden key or pleaded with him not 
to turn her in for doing so likely contributed to whether or not the participant confessed and to 
how convincing the confession was.  In the cases where the confederates urged the participants 
to press the key, participants may have felt less guilty about helping a female, compared to if a 
male asked.  In the condition where the confederates begged the participants not to turn her in for 
the fear of not getting her desired job position, the participant may have conformed to the 
stereotypical idea that men should protect women (Eagly & Crowley, 1986).  In either case, the 
role of gender becomes a factor that is not always a component of a confession.   
Additionally, the ‘alt’ key paradigm that was used in this study has been thought to be of 
low salience (e.g., Horselenberg et al., 2003; Russano et al., 2005).  In the ‘alt’ key paradigm 
participants are accused of causing the computer to crash by hitting the ‘alt’ key, a highly 
plausible action as the ‘alt’ key is close to the main keys used when typing.  Therefore, it is very 
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possible that participants confessed to hitting the ‘alt’ key simply due to the fact that they could 
have accidentally hit it and not noticed.  Furthermore, the motivation for falsely confessing in 
this study was to cover for another person in order to help them avoid getting in trouble.  That is, 
participants who falsely confessed were not trying to avoid blame; rather, they were trying to 
convince the interrogator that they were guilty.  In real life cases voluntary false confessions do 
occur but are rare.  In a typical case the suspect is initially resistant and will only confess after 
the interrogator pressures them to do so (Kassin, 1997). 
Statement of Problem 
With 273 felony convictions overturned in United States history due to DNA evidence, 
understanding why people confess to crimes they did not commit, and whether the perspective 
the confession is videotaped from affects judgments of these confessions as true or false, is 
necessary to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.  Specifically, a number of 
researchers have demonstrated that a proportion of those who confess to committing a crime 
falsely confess, and the conditions under which people falsely confess have been investigated 
(e.g., Kassin & Keichel, 1996; Lassiter et al., manuscript in preparation (cited in Snyder et al., 
2009); Russano et al., 2005).  However, the findings from previous research as to the proportion 
of people that falsely confess vary.  This variation may be due to differences in procedure as well 
as the limitations previously mentioned, both of which may limit the generalizability of the 
results. 
Furthermore, past research has shown that people are generally poor at distinguishing 
videotaped true from false confessions (e.g., Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). However, 
these chance-level accuracy rates may be due to videotaped confessions typically being suspect-
focused.  Previous research on the camera perspective bias has been very informative, but the 
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phenomenon in not yet fully understood.  Additionally, Experiment 2 is the first research to 
address accuracy in distinguishing true from false denials.  
Previous findings make up a solid base for confession research to continue, and they have 
important implications for social psychology and the criminal justice system.  It is important to 
research false confessions and the camera perspective bias further, in order to apply the findings 
to real world confession evidence and juror decision-making.  The current studies were 
conducted to gain a better understanding of the proportion of people who confess to and who 
deny cheating, as well as to test the effect of camera perspective on the accuracy with which 
people can judge the guilt of suspects who confess and deny. 
Experiment 1 
Prior research suggests that when accused of a crime some proportion of guilty 
participants will confess and some proportion of innocent participants will confess as well (e.g., 
Lassiter et al., manuscript in preparation (as cited in Snyder et al., 2009); Russano et al., 2005).  
Experiment 1 sought to investigate these proportions as well as the proportion of guilty 
participants who deny committing the crime they are accused of and the proportion of innocent 
participants who deny committing that crime.   
Experiment 1 was designed to eliminate limitations in the existing research on 
confessions and interrogations in four important ways.  First, in order to investigate whether the 
gender of the confederate has an impact on confession rates, male confederates were used in the 
current study, whereas all female confederates were used in Russano et al. (2005) and Lassiter et 
al., manuscript in preparation (as cited in Snyder et al., 2009).  Although the use of both male 
and female confederates would have been ideal, due to personnel limitations this was not 
possible. Second, instead of covering for another person’s indiscretions, participants were always 
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accused of cheating themselves.  Third, the consequences of confessing were made salient, as 
would be the case in real world settings.  That is, cheating is considered academic dishonesty and 
could result in a failing course grade and/or expulsion from the university.  Lastly, instead of 
being unsure of whether they committed the crime, as in the ‘alt’ key paradigm (Kassin & 
Keichel, 1996), participants knew whether or not they cheated.  Specifically, it was predicted that 
confession rates and number of guilty participants would be smaller than in previous findings 
due to: participants being accused of the crime instead of covering for another person; being 
accused of a crime that they know whether they committed it or not; having some consequence 
for cheating made salient; and using male confederates and male interrogators. 
Method 
Participants.  Fifty (36 female) undergraduate psychology students from the University 
of Arkansas participated to obtain research credit for their General Psychology course.  Data 
from four of the 50 participants (8%) were excluded from analysis, three who revealed they were 
aware of the true purpose of the experiment before or during participation and one who became 
distressed during the experiment, which resulted in the immediate termination of the session.  All 
demographic data and analyses are based on the remaining 46 participants (32 female).  Thirty-
two participants were female and the mean age of participants was 19.02 (SD = 1.50, Range = 18 
to 25).  Two participants self-identified as African American, two as Native American or 
Alaskan Native, 35 as Caucasian, two as Hispanic, four as Asian or Pacific Islander, and one 
participant chose not to indicate their race or ethnicity.  Because one of the main purposes of 
Experiment 1 was to collect materials for Experiment 2, when all videotaped confessions/denials 
had been collected except for the last one, a female false confession, only Caucasian females 
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between the ages of 18 and 24 were given the opportunity to participate in order to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining a female false confession. 
Materials.  At the beginning of the experiment participants signed a statement of consent 
to participate and provided demographic information (i.e., gender, age, race or ethnicity, and 
year in college).  
A problem-solving worksheet, similar to Scattergories, was administered in which 
participants formed a word beginning with an indicated letter that matched a given clue (see 
Appendix A).  Participants were informed their answers had to be real places, names, or things.  
For example, using the letter ‘A’ as the first letter in a boys name could result in an answer of 
‘Adam.’ 
Three Sony Mobile HD Snap Cameras (digital video cameras) were hidden from sight, in 
order to avoid influencing the participants’ responses during the interrogation, to videotape the 
interrogations for use in future experiments.  The interrogations were videotaped from three 
different perspectives.  In the suspect-focused perspective, the camera was hidden behind the 
interrogator and was angled downward focusing on the suspect for the entire interrogation.  In 
the interrogator-focused perspective, the camera was hidden behind and to the right of the 
suspect and focused on the interrogator during the course of the interrogation.  Finally, in the 
equal-focused perspective, the camera was hidden to the side of the suspect and the interrogator 
and showed a profile shot that equally displayed the interrogator and the suspect during the 
course of the interrogation. 
At the conclusion of the experiment participants signed a statement of debriefing and a 
statement of release to use the videotapes of the interrogations in future studies. 
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Design.  Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the guilty condition, where 
the confederate initiated cheating by asking the participant for help on a problem-solving task 
they were told to work on individually.  The other half of the participants were assigned to the 
innocent condition, where the confederate did not elicit help from the participant on the problem-
solving task they were to work on individually.  Whether the participant signed a written 
confession to cheating was the primary dependent variable.   
Procedure.  Participants were run one at a time.  When participants arrived they sat in 
the experimental waiting area with the confederate.  At the start of the study the experimenter 
retrieved both the participant and the confederate at the same time and led them to the 
experiment room.  The experimenter made eye contact with the participant and casually gestured 
to a seat furthest from the door (this was to make it more plausible that the experimenter would 
later have the confederate leave the room first).  In line with the Russano et al. (2005) protocol, 
the participant and confederate were told that the experiment was about decision-making and 
problem-solving, and that the researchers were interested in whether individuals or teams make 
better decisions and are better problem-solvers.  The pair then signed a statement of consent to 
participate.  
The participant and confederate were informed that the researchers were specifically 
interested in the types of problems best solved by individuals and by teams.  The two were then 
told that because most problem-solving relationships in the real world do not involve two 
strangers they would be given about five minutes to get to know one another.  Rapport building 
was necessary in order to increase the likelihood that some participants would cheat. 
When the experimenter returned, participants were told that they would be solving four 
different sets of problems, similar to Scattegories, in which they were to use the indicated letter 
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to form words that fit the given clue and began with the indicated letter.  Each problem was 
clearly marked as to whether they were to work together or independently.  Participants were 
told to start by completing the first individual problem, and that although their problems were 
identical, it was very important to work separately on both of the individual problems.  
Additionally, the participant and confederate were told to move on to the team problem only 
after they had both completed the individual problem and this pattern should remain the same 
until the two individual and two team problems were solved.  After the experimenter explained 
that each problem should take no longer than five minutes, and that they should try their hardest 
come up with an answer for each problem, the experimenter left the room for 20 minutes. 
For participants in the guilty condition, after the confederate was certain the participant 
had written down an answer for ‘something terrifying’ that begins with the letter ‘P’ on the last 
individual section, the confederate said, “I can’t get the answer for ‘something terrifying,’ what 
did you get?”   If the participant did not give the confederate an answer, the confederate did not 
ask a second time.  For participants in the innocent condition, the confederate did not make a 
request for the other participant to cheat.  However, if participants in the innocent condition 
initiated cheating on their own, they were classified as guilty.  Therefore, participants who gave 
the confederate at least one answer during the individual sections or asked for at least one answer 
during the individual sections were considered to have cheated, thus were classified as guilty.  
Participants who did not give the confederate any answers during the individual sections and did 
not ask for answers during the individual sections were considered not to have cheated, thus were 
classified as innocent. 
After the 20-minute problem-solving period, the experimenter returned to the room, 
collected the answer sheets, and gave the participant and confederate a form to fill out their 
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demographic information.  The experimenter stated that he was going to score the sheets, and left 
again for five minutes.   
Blind to the condition, the experimenter returned to the room and stated, “It looks like we 
may have a problem.  Um, I think I’ll speak with each of you separately.  [Confederate], why 
don’t you come with me?  [Participant], I’ll be back in just a minute” (Russano et al., 2005).  The 
confederate was taken out of the room for five minutes, leaving the participant alone.  After the 
five-minute period the experimenter returned and led the participant to a small windowless room 
equipped with three hidden cameras.   
The experimenter then conducted an interrogation and attempted to get the participant to 
confess to the crime of cheating on the individual problems and sign a written confession.  The 
interrogation simulated an average interrogation, where the interrogator pushed for a confession 
but did not physically or psychologically harm the suspect.  The experimenter stated that he had 
just spoken with the confederate and there did seem to be a problem, it appeared the two had 
worked together on the individual sections and if that were the case they not only broke the rules 
of the experiment but also compromised the integrity of the study.   
Participants were told that the experimenter had contacted their professor who was “very 
upset” about the situation.  The experimenter then stated he was not sure whom his professor 
might notify about the situation and that his professor may consider the situation to be a case of 
cheating.  The experimenter told the participant that he needed to document what happened and 
took out a piece of notebook paper and wrote, “I shared answers on the individual problems.”  
The experimenter handed the written confession to the participant and said, “I need you to sign 
this to document what happened.  My professor may want to talk with you about it later.”  If the 
participant refused to sign the written confession the experimenter made three more statements 
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maximizing the participant’s involvement in the cheating (e.g., “I’ve run this experiment a dozen 
times and no one has had identical answers like you two did”), followed by four statements 
minimizing the participant’s involvement (e.g., “I’m sure you were just trying to be helpful, I 
probably would have done the same thing if I were in your shoes”), all of which prompted the 
participant to confess.  
If at any of the eight prompts to confess the participant confessed to cheating and signed 
the confession written by the experimenter, the participant was asked to explain in detail how the 
cheating transpired.  If the participant still denied cheating after all eight prompts to confess the 
experimenter then simply asked them one last time to sign the confession.  The experimenter 
then left the room, with or without the written confession.  In either case, the experimenter 
simply stated, “I’ll be right back.”   
When the experimenter returned, a one on one funnel debriefing took place as a 
manipulation check (see below).  Participants were then asked to sign a debriefing form and a 
release allowing the researchers to use the videotapes of their interrogation in future studies.  At 
the conclusion of the experiment participants partook in a brief positive mood induction session 
involving three components.  Participants listened to a positive upbeat song (The Who’s “The 
Blue, Red and Gray”) while closing their eyes and thinking about a time in their life when they 
felt most happy and at peace.  Finally, participants were given a small unexpected gift (a 
chocolate chip cookie).  Participants were then thanked for their time and given credit for 
participating. 
Results 
Manipulation check.  Because of the general public’s recent interest in confessions and 
interrogations, it is possible that some participants could have become aware of the true purpose 
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of the experiment sometime before or during the interrogation.  Thus, a manipulation check was 
completed to screen out participants that were aware of the purpose of the study.  At the 
conclusion of the experiment, all participants underwent a funnel debriefing that gradually 
revealed the true purpose of the study in order to allow the experimenter to judge if the 
participant appeared to have been aware of the purpose of the study.   
Participants were asked if they had any questions about the experiment, what they 
thought about the experiment, and what they thought was the purpose of the experiment.  
Participants were then asked if anything about the experiment seemed odd or unusual to them 
and whether it felt like the experimenter was trying to “pull the wool over their eyes” at any 
point during the experiment.  Finally, participants were asked whether they thought it was 
possible for a person to confess to a crime they did not commit.  The experimenter then 
explained the true purpose of the experiment and the reasons for conducting it.  If at any time 
during the debriefing a participant indicated that he or she knew the true purpose of the 
experiment prior to or during the experiment, they were excluded from analysis (which was the 
case for three participants). 
Analyses.  Results showed that 47.80% of participants were guilty of cheating.  
Additionally, it was found that 58.70% of participants confessed to cheating.  Of the confessions 
given, 41.30% were true confessions and 17.40% were false confessions.  Additionally, of the 
41.30% of participants that denied cheating, 36.96% were true denials and 4.35% were false 
denials.   
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 was conducted in order to determine the proportion of participates that 
would confess to cheating, or deny cheating, when accused.  Previous research has demonstrated 
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that, depending on the exact manipulation, participants who are interrogated will confess 
between of the time (e.g., Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Forrest et al., 2002; Horselenberg et al., 2003; 
Redlich & Goodman, 2003).  It has also been found that, depending on the exact manipulation, 
almost all participants that engaged in a cheating paradigm similar to the one used in Experiment 
1 cheated (Russano et al., 2005).   
The results from Experiment 1 support the first hypothesis that both confession rates and 
the number of guilty participants would be lower than in most of the previous research on 
confessions and interrogations.  This discrepancy in results is likely due to differences in 
methodologies.  Specifically, the lower confession rate found in the current study was likely due 
to participants being accused of cheating themselves and not covering for someone else, knowing 
for a fact whether they had cheated instead of being accused of a highly plausible and possibly 
accidental act of hitting a computer key, consequences for cheating being explicitly stated, and 
using male confederates and interrogators.  Furthermore, the smaller number of guilty 
participants may have been due to using male confederates, simply because male participants 
may have felt less obligated or been less willing to help a male versus a female confederate 
(Eagly & Crowley, 1986).  
Experiment 1 contributed to the evidence that it is possible to obtain false confessions 
under different, more ecologically valid conditions.  However, Experiment 1 does not speak to 
how potential jurors view these more ecologically valid confessions and denials.  Therefore, 
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to determine the effects of camera perspective on 
judgments of guilt and attributions of responsibility using ecologically valid videotaped 
confessions and interrogations.  
Experiment 2 
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Existing research has demonstrated that the camera perspective from which a confession 
is videotaped affects whether or not the confession is seen as voluntary (e.g., Lassiter & Irvine, 
1986), as well as both judgments of guilt and sentencing recommendations (e.g., Snyder et al., 
2009; Lassiter et al., 2002; Lassiter et al., 2003; Lassiter et al., 2007).  Lassiter et al. (manuscript 
in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 2009) provided a partial answer to how the perspective in 
which the confession is videotaped influences the ability to accurately distinguish between true 
and false confessions.  However, the videotaped interrogations used in previous research may 
have affected the way the confessions were judged, thus bringing into question the 
generalizability of the results.   
In Experiment 2, the videotaped interrogations from Experiment 1, where experimenters 
(hereafter referred to as interrogators) accused participants (hereafter referred to as suspects) of 
cheating were used as stimulus material.  Because the interrogations from Experiment 1 were 
more ecologically valid then some used in previous studies, more appropriate conclusions can be 
drawn as to the effects of camera perspective on the accuracy of true and false confessions.  
Additionally, these same videotapes can speak to the same aspects of camera perspective on 
accuracy for videotaped true and false denials.  To the author’s knowledge, the present study is 
the first to investigate whether observers are able to identify true and false denials. 
Experiment 2 addressed three important questions regarding videotaped interrogations.  
First, can people accurately distinguish between true and false confessions?  Second, when a 
suspect denies committing a crime, can people accurately distinguish a true from false denial?  
Lastly, what effect does camera perspective have on judgments of guilt and attributions of 
responsibility?  Specifically, four hypotheses were addressed concerning videotaped confessions 
and denials.  
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• Hypothesis 1: Participants would not be able to accurately distinguish between 
true denials and false denials, in line with previous research showing that 
accuracy in distinguishing between true and false confessions is generally around 
chance (e.g., Kassin et al., 2005; Bradford et al., 2008).   
• Hypothesis 2:  Suspects who confess would be judged as more guilty than those 
who deny cheating, and those who deny cheating would be judged as more 
innocent than those who confessed due to the truth bias (e.g., Levine, Sun Park, & 
McCornack, 1999;). 
• Hypothesis 3:  Accuracy in judgments of guilt would be greatest in the 
interrogator-focused condition followed by the equal-focused condition, and 
poorest in the suspect-focused condition.  This pattern of accuracy would likely 
be due to situational factors being available (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986; Lassiter et 
al., 2003; Lassiter et al., manuscript in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 
2009). 
• Hypothesis 4:  Participants would be more likely to make dispositional 
attributions of responsibility in the suspect-focused condition, both dispositional 
and situational attributions in the equal-focused condition, and situational 
attributions in the interrogator-focused condition due to illusory causation (Ross, 
1977).  However, overall dispositional attributions would be more common than 
situational attributions due the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977; Gilbert 
et al., 1990). 
Method 
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 Participants.  One hundred and seventy-eight undergraduate psychology students from 
the University of Arkansas participated for research credit in their General Psychology course.  
Twelve of the 178 participants (6.74%) failed to complete the experiment, nine due to computer 
malfunction, and three who were unable to complete the experiment in the allotted session time 
of one hour.  All demographic data and analyses for guilt judgments are based on the remaining 
166 (112 female) participants.  Participants’ age was determined by participants pressing a 
number one through eight on the keyboard indicating their age as either 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, or 25+ years old; the median age was 19-years-old.  Eight participants self-identified as 
African American, two as Native American or Alaskan Native, 137 as Caucasian, nine as 
Hispanic, six as Asian or Pacific Islander, and four as biracial.  
Materials.  Eight videotaped interrogations from Experiment 1 were selected to be used 
in Experiment 2 based on several criteria.  First, one male and one female true confession, false 
confession, true denial, and false denial were needed for Experiment 2.  In order to keep the 
demographic information about the suspects consistent across videos, all suspects were to be 
Caucasian and between the ages of 18 and 24.  In the cases where there was more than one 
videotaped interrogation that fit the required criteria, videos were chosen based on the quality of 
the video.  Due to the nature of the cameras being hidden some videos contained obstructions 
that blocked part of the camera view.  Therefore, the videos used in Experiment 2 were of one 
true and one false confession from a Caucasian male and a female (between the ages of 18 and 
24) where the view was not obstructed, as well one true and one false denial from a Caucasian 
male and female (between the ages of 18 and 24) where the view was not obstructed.  The 
videotaped interrogations were edited to include the moments before the interrogator and suspect 
entered the room to the moment right after the interrogator left the room.  The videotaped 
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interrogations and the majority of the questions were displayed via stimulus presentation 
software, SuperLab.  
Design.  Experiment 2 employed a mixed-factor design where the gender of the suspect, 
two guilt conditions (guilty or innocent), and two statement conditions (confessed or denied) 
served as three within-subjects factors.  The three camera angles from which the interrogations 
were recorded (interrogator-focused, suspect-focused, and equal-focused) served as a between-
subjects factor.  
Procedure.  Small groups of participants (no more than five) were run in each session.  
Participants were randomly assigned to view the videotaped interrogations from either the 
suspect-focused, interrogator-focused, or equal-focused camera perspective.  Participants were 
told that they would be presented with several short videotaped interrogations and that in each 
case the person being interrogated was suspected of cheating on a problem-solving task in an 
earlier experiment.  Participants electronically signed a statement of consent to participate and 
filled out demographic information about themselves (i.e., gender, age, race or ethnicity, and 
year in college).  
The experiment was presented via SuperLab and consisted of eight blocks, each 
containing four events: instructions, video, decision, and attributions.  Instructions for the 
interrogations where the suspect confessed stated that “in some cases the interrogation involved a 
guilty person who confessed to cheating and really did cheat.  However, in other cases the 
interrogation involved an innocent person who, because of the pressure of the interrogation, 
confessed to cheating even though they did not really cheat.”  In the videotapes where the 
suspect denied cheating, the instructions stated that “in some cases the interrogation involved an 
innocent person who did not confess to cheating and really did not cheat.  However, in other 
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cases the interrogation involved a guilty person who feared the repercussions of cheating and did 
not confess even though they really did cheat.”   
Immediately after watching each video participants made their judgment as to the guilt of 
the suspect and rated their confidence in their decision on a 10-point scale (from 0 = 0% to 10 = 
100%).  Finally, participants handwrote answers to two open-ended questions for each video: 
“What factors led you to come to your conclusion about whether the accused person cheated or 
not?”; “Was there anything special to note that happened during the interrogation that may have 
led the accused to confess to cheating or deny cheating?” 
Results 
Guilt judgments.  The data were analyzed using a 2 (Gender of the suspect) × 2 (Guilt: 
guilty or innocent) × 2 (Statement: confessed or denied) × 3 (Camera Perspective: interrogator-
focused, suspect-focused, or equal-focused) mixed-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
participants’ judgments of the guilt of the suspect and their confidence in their judgment.  Guilt 
was rated on a dichotomous scale where positive one indicated that the participant believed the 
suspect was guilty of cheating and negative one indicated the participant thought the suspect was 
innocent.  Confidence was rated on a 10-point scale from 0% to 100%.  In line with previous 
research, a scalar variable of guilt assessment was constructed by combining participants’ 
dichotomous judgments of guilt with the corresponding confidence ratings (Kassin & McNall, 
1991).  It has been suggested that this composite measure, ranging from -10 (100% confidence in 
innocence) to +10 (100% confidence in guilt), is a more sensitive index of guilt assessment 
(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979) and it maintains ecological validity (Diamond, 1997). 
Results of the mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for gender of 
the suspect, with female suspects being judged as less innocent (M = -.76, SD = 4.36) than male 
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suspects (M = -2.51, SD = 3.62), F(1, 163) = 26.16, p < .001, MSE = 42.11.  There was also a 
significant main effect of guilt, with guilty suspects be judged as more guilty (M = .31, SD = 
4.04) than innocent suspects (M = -3.57, SD = 3.82), F(1, 163) =  128.343, p < .001, MSE = 
38.72.  Additionally, a third significant main effect for statement was found, with suspects that 
confessed to cheating being judged as more guilty (M = .16, SD = 4.05) than suspects that denied 
cheating (M = -3.57, SD = 3.82), F(1, 163) = 71.23, p < .001, MSE = 57.20. 
A significant two-way interaction was found between gender of the suspect and guilt, 
F(1, 163) = 49.77, p < .001, MSE = 39.46.  Simple effects tests revealed that participants were 
able to distinguish between guilty male suspects and innocent male suspects, t(163)= 13.72, p < 
.001 (see Table 1).  Additionally, participants were rather good at distinguishing between guilty 
female suspects and innocent female suspects, t(163) = 3.16, p = .003.  However, the difference 
in guilt ratings between guilty and innocent males was greater than the difference in guilty 
ratings between guilty and innocent females, t(163) = 7.02, p < .001 (see Figure 1). 
A second significant two-way interaction between guilt and statement was also found, 
F(1, 163) = 45.85, p < .001, MSE = 33.40.  Simple effects tests revealed that participants were 
able to distinguish between innocent suspects that confessed to cheating and innocent suspects 
that denied cheating, t(163) = 3.85, p < .001.  However, participants were only able to identify 
guilty suspects when they confessed to cheating, t(163) = 13.12 , p < .001.  Furthermore, the 
difference in guilt ratings between the guilty and innocent suspects that confessed was larger 
than the difference between the guilty and innocent suspects that denied cheating t(163) = 7.00, p 
< .001 (see Figure 2). 
Additionally, a significant three-way interaction was found between statement, camera 
perspective and gender of the suspect, F(2, 163) = 3.77, p = .025, MSE = 34.18.  As can be seen 
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in Figure 3, female suspects who confessed were judged as guiltier, and female suspects that 
denied cheating were judged as more innocent, when the camera perspective was interrogator-
focused.  However, male suspects who confessed were judged as more guilty when the camera 
perspective was equal-focus, but male suspects that denied cheating were judged as more 
innocent when the camera perspective was suspect-focus.  Additionally, the difference in guilt 
ratings between suspects who confessed to cheating and suspects that denied cheating was larger 
in the interrogator-focus than in the equal-focus.  However, pairwise comparisons revealed that 
this difference was only significant for females F(2, 163) = 5.06, p = .002, MSE = 50.74, 95% CI 
[1.57, 6.73]. 
 Attributions of Behavior.  The two open-ended attribution questions were handwritten 
on a paper questionnaire separate from the SuperLab data.  Unfortunately, the handwritten 
attribution questionnaire for 14 of the 166 participants (8.43%) was misplaced.  All analyses on 
participants’ attributions are based on the remaining 152 participants.  Collapsing across the two 
open-ended questions of attributions of responsibility for suspects’ statements, the responses 
were coded as containing dispositional attributions, situational attributions, both, or neither.  Two 
independent coders, blind to the condition, coded all responses (averaged across items kappa= 
.42) and the primary investigator resolved any discrepancies.   
A dispositional attribution score and a situational attribution score was created using a 
dichotomous scale where the attribution type was either present or absent.  Combining responses 
where participants indicated that a dispositional attribution was present or both a dispositional 
and situational attribution was present created the dispositional attribution score. Combining 
responses where participants indicated that a situational attribution was present or both a 
dispositional and situational attribution was present created the situational attribution score.  The 
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difference between the dispositional and situational scores were then calculated in order to 
evaluate the relative weight participants gave to dispositional or situational factors.  For example, 
imagine the first participant made a dispositional attribution but not a situational attribution for 
the first video they watched.  That participant would receive a 1 for the dispositional attribution 
and a 0 for the absence of a situational attribution, thus the score would be 1-0 = 1.  Now 
imagine that the second participant made a situational attribution but not a dispositional 
attribution for the first video they watched.  That participant would receive a 0 for the absence of 
a dispositional attribution and a 1 for the situational attribution, thus the score would be 0-1= -1.  
Finally, imagine the third participant made both a dispositional and situational attribution for the 
first video they watched. That participant would receive a 1 for the dispositional attribution and a 
1 for the situational attribution, thus the score would be 1-1= 0. 
The data were analyzed using two 2 (Gender of the suspect) × 2 (Guilt: guilty or 
innocent) × 2 (Statement: confessed or denied) × 3 (Camera Perspective: interrogator-focused, 
suspect-focused, or equal-focused) mixed-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 
difference scores between dispositional and situational attributions.  Positive difference scores 
indicated that dispositional attributions were more common, negative difference scores indicated 
that situational attributions were more common, and difference scores close to zero indicated that 
dispositional and situational attributions were about equally common. 
Results of the mixed-factorial ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of statement 
where more dispositional attributions were made for suspects that denied cheating (M = .20, SD 
= .70) and both dispositional and situational attributions were made about equally for suspects 
that confessed to cheating (M = .04, SD = .69), F(1, 149) = 20.02, p < .001, MSE = .39.  A 
second significant main effect was found for condition where more dispositional attributions 
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were made for suspects viewed from the suspect-focused perspective (M = .23, SD = .67) than 
suspects viewed from the equal-focus perspective (M = .15, SD = .70), and both dispositional and 
situational attributions were made about equally for suspects viewed from the interrogator-
focused perspective (M = -.02, SD = .69), F(2, 149) = 5.71, p = .004, MSE = 1.20. 
A significant two-way interaction between gender of the suspect and guilt was found, 
F(1, 149) = 25.71, p < .001, MSE = .37.  For females, the difference between dispositional and 
situational ratings was greater for guilty than for innocent suspects (see Table 2).  However, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that for males the difference between dispositional and situational 
ratings was significantly greater for innocent suspects than for guilty suspects, t(151) = -2.02, p = 
.045 (see Figure 4). 
A second significant two-way interaction between gender of the suspect and camera 
perspective, F(2, 149) = 4.16, p = .017, MSE = .29.  Participants made both dispositional & 
situational attributions about equally for both males and females in the interrogator-focused 
condition and more dispositional attributions for both males and females in the suspect-focused 
condition.  It was also found that although participants made both dispositional & situational 
attributions about equally for males and females in the interrogator-focused condition and more 
dispositional attributions for males and females in the equal focused condition, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that this was only significant for females, F(2, 149) = 6.73, p = .002, MSE 
= .19, 95% CI [1.57, 6.73] (see Figure 5).   
Additionally, a significant three-way interaction was found between gender of the 
suspect, guilt, and statement, F(1, 149) = 6.79, p = .010, MSE = .38.  It was found that 
dispositional attributions were more common for innocent females that denied cheating and 
situational attributions were more common for innocent females that confessed to cheating, 
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t(151) = -4.15, p <  .001.  However, for guilty females there was little difference between those 
that confessed to cheating and those that denied cheating (see Figure 6).  Additionally, it was 
found that dispositional attributions were more common for guilty males that denied cheating 
and situational attributions were more common for guilty males that confessed to cheating, 
t(151) = -5.64, p <  .001.  However, for innocent males there was little difference between those 
that confessed to cheating and those that denied cheating. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was designed to investigate if, and when, individuals are able to distinguish 
between true and false confessions, as well as between true and false denials.  Additionally, 
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to further investigate how the angle from which a 
confession or denial is videotaped influences judgments of guilt as well as the type and amount 
of attributions made for suspects’ statements.  In support of Hypothesis 1, participants were 
unable to distinguish between suspects that were innocent and denied cheating and suspects that 
were guilty and denied cheating.  This finding is in accordance with research showing that 
people are unable to distinguish between true and false confessions at rates above chance (e.g., 
Kassin et al., 2005; Bradford et al., 2008).  In support of the second hypothesis, it was found that 
suspects that denied cheating were judged as more innocent and suspects that confessed to 
cheating were judged as more guilty, likely due to the truth bias (Levine et al., 1999).  However, 
overall suspects were judged as innocent more often than guilty.  Contrary to the third hypothesis 
and previous research (Lassiter and Irvine, 1986; Lassiter et al., 2003; Lassiter et al., manuscript 
in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 2009), accuracy in guilt judgments was not influenced by 
camera perspective alone.  This finding was unexpected and may be a result of where the 
cameras were positioned in the current study.  
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In support of the fourth hypothesis, participants made more dispositional than situational 
attributions for suspects’ statements likely due to the fundamental attribution error (Taylor & 
Fiske, 1975).  Furthermore, it was found that more dispositional attributions were made in the 
suspect-focused condition than in the equal-focused condition, and both dispositional and 
situational attributions were made about equally for suspects when the interrogator was the focus 
of the camera.  Although this finding does not completely support the fourth hypothesis, the 
pattern of results is similar to the pattern of predicted results.  This finding can be explained by a 
combination of the fundamental attribution error and illusory causation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). 
Unexpectedly, gender of the suspect was found to have in impact on guilt judgments 
where females were judged as less innocent than males.  This finding may be due to using a 
limited number of videotaped interrogations, thus allowing for the possibility that judgments 
were based on physical individual differences between suspects.  Additionally, gender was found 
to have an effect in several ways on participants’ attributions for suspects’ confessions.  These 
findings are also like to due the limited number of videotaped interrogations used. 
General Discussion 
Currently 273 convictions have been overturned in the United States history due to DNA 
evidence, and almost 25% of those cases involved false confession evidence (Innocence Project, 
2011).  The idea that someone would confess to a crime they did not commit may seem 
unfathomable; however, both documented cases and past research proves false confessions do 
occur.  If a defendant is taken to trial and confession evidence is admitted, the jury must decide 
how much weight to give the confession.  Accuracy in judging the validity of a confession is 
extremely important because false confessions are currently considered to be one of the primary 
causes of wrongful convictions of innocent people (Klaver et al., 2008).   
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The current research was designed to be an in depth study of the effect of camera 
perspective on the ability of jurors to judge the reliability of confessions and denials.  The 
purpose of Experiment 1 was to create an ecologically valid interrogation environment in order 
to obtain videotaped confessions and denials.  The purpose of Experiment 2 was to evaluate the 
effect of camera perspective on participants’ judgments of guilt and attributions of responsibility 
for the suspects’ statements. 
The first hypothesis tested in Experiment 1, that the proportion of suspects that confessed 
to cheating would be lower in general than found by previous research (e.g., Kassin & Keichel, 
1996; Redlich & Goodman, 2003; Russano et al., 2005), was supported.  The lower confession 
rate found in the current study was likely due to important differences in methodologies.  One 
difference is that the ‘alt’ key paradigm has been used in much of the previous research on 
confessions and interrogations.  Although this paradigm was revolutionary in this field of 
research, the high plausibility of accidentally hitting the ‘alt’ key on a keyboard dramatically 
affects confession rates.  If suspects are not sure whether or not they “committed the crime” they 
may be more likely to assume it was possible that they did, and thus confess.  Suspects in 
Experiment 1 were accused of cheating, a crime in which they know whether they were guilty or 
innocent.  Therefore, suspects that were in fact innocent were more likely to deny cheating 
because they knew they had not committed the crime. 
Another difference in methodologies that may have contributed to the lower confession 
rates in the current study was the motivation for confessing.  For example, in Lassiter et al. 
(manuscript in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 2009) half of the participants were urged to 
cover for the confederate that had cheated, so the motivation for some to confess was to cover for 
another person, not to cover for himself.  In true interrogations most people do not confess unless 
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there is some sort of personal benefit (e.g., leniency or arousal reduction).  Although voluntary 
false confessions do occur they are rare (Kassin, 1997).  Experiment 1 was more in line with real 
life interrogations, where the suspect initially denies the accusation and only confesses after 
pressure is applied from the interrogator.   
It is also possible that the lower confession rate found in Experiment 1, compared to 
previous research, was due to the consequences of confessing.  Confessing to a crime in the real 
world can have serious repercussions, such as jail time or financial restitution.  In the current 
study, and in some previous research such as Russano et al. (2005), a consequence for 
committing the crime (i.e., cheating) was made explicit.  Suspects were told that the interrogator 
had informed their professor about situation and that the professor may consider the situation a 
case of cheating.  The consequence for being caught cheating became very salient for suspects 
when it was explained that cheating would constitute academic dishonesty and could result in 
disciplinary action by the department and/or the University.  Therefore, it is highly likely that 
fewer suspects confessed to the crime because they were aware of the negative consequences for 
doing so. 
 Furthermore, in Experiment 1 less than half of suspects cheated, whereas almost all 
participants cheated in a similar study (Russano et al., 2005).  The dramatic difference in the 
proportion of guilty suspects between the current study and Russano et al. is possibly due to the 
current researcher using both male confederates and male interrogators as opposed to all female 
confederates and all male interrogators.  There is a stereotype that men should protect women, 
therefore using male confederates instead of female confederates may have reduced the number 
of males that cheated because they felt less obligated to do so (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). 
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False confession evidence used in the legal system partly depends on how the judge and 
jury interpret it.  If confession evidence is submitted for trial in the form of a videotape it seems 
as though the judge and jury would be able to make more thorough and accurate decisions about 
the validity of the confession (Lassiter et al., 2001).  However, the angle from which the 
confession is recorded may have an impact on how the defendant is perceived.  
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to investigate what, if any, effects camera 
perspective has on judgments of guilt and attributions of responsibility for confessing to or 
denying committing a crime.  In support of the first hypothesis tested in Experiment 2, it was 
found that participants were unable to distinguish between suspects who were innocent and 
denied cheating and suspects who were guilty and denied cheating.  When suspects denied 
cheating participants judged them as innocent even when the suspect falsely denied cheating.  
This inability to distinguish between true and false denials is in accordance with previous 
research demonstrating that, for the most part; people are only able to distinguish between true 
and false confessions at chance levels (e.g., Kassin et al., 2005; Bradford et al., 2008).  If 
participants judge the denials as generally valid, regardless of validity, we may learn if and when 
people are able to identify one’s deception.  By analyzing when and why participants believe a 
denial is valid we may be able to train law enforcement personnel how to spot innocent and 
guilty suspects.  Therefore, it may be possible to reduce the number of coerced confession, as 
well as learn when to continue investigating a suspect. 
 In support of the second hypothesis tested in Experiment 2, it was found that suspects 
who denied cheating were judged as more innocent and suspects who confessed to cheating were 
judged as more guilty.  The tendency for participants to believe suspects’ statements is in line 
with previous research on the truth bias (Levine et al., 1999).  Because participants encounter 
   42
    
more truthful messages on a regular basis, they are more likely to believe the suspects’ 
statements are true (O’Sullivan et al., 1988).  It is also possible that this tendency is simply due 
to participants’ desire to use as little cognitive resources as possible.  By taking the suspects’ 
statements at face value, participants do not have to devote much cognitive resources to the task.  
Previous research has found that incoming information is originally encoded as truthful, and for 
information to be considered false it must be re-examined (Gilbert et al., 1990).  Due to the 
difficulty of re-analyzing this information, it is possible that participants made errors, leaving 
them to fail to account for false confessions and false denials. 
However, overall suspects were judged as innocent more often than guilty.  It is possible 
that participants assumed most suspects were innocent because of the nature of the crime they 
were accused of committing.  In other words, because participants had likely participated in other 
experiments in the psychology department for course credit they may have thought most 
undergraduate students would see no reason or benefit to cheat in a research experiment.  It may 
have also been the case that participants did not view sharing answers with the confederate as 
cheating.  In other words, even if participants thought the suspects may have shared answers on 
the individual portions of the problem-solving task, they were hesitant to label suspects as guilty 
of cheating. 
The results of Experiment 2 did not support the third hypothesis being tested, that 
accuracy in judgments of guilt would be greatest when the camera was focused on the 
interrogator (interrogator-focused condition) than when the camera was focused on a profile 
view of both the suspect and the interrogator (equal-focused) followed by when the camera was 
focused on the suspect (suspect-focused).  The finding that camera perspective did not affect 
accuracy in judgments of guilt likely reflects the fact that although participants were able to 
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accurately distinguish between innocent suspects that both confessed to and denied cheating, 
they were only able to accurately identify guilty suspects that confessed to cheating.  Therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that this accuracy rates would not vary across camera perspectives. 
The lack of camera perspective bias in the current study is in contrast to previous 
research where accuracy has been found to be the greatest in the interrogator-focused condition, 
followed by the equal-focused condition, then the suspect-focused condition (Lassiter et al., 
2003; Lassiter et al., manuscript in preparation, as cited in Snyder et al., 2009).  This discrepancy 
in results may be due to differences in the quality of the videos themselves.  In previous research 
(e.g., Snyder et al., 2009; Ware, Lassiter; Patterson, & Ransom, 2008) the quality of the 
videotaped interrogations was rather good.  In the current study, there were limited places to hide 
the video cameras so they had to be hidden in places (e.g., an artificial flower pot) that made it 
difficult to get a good close up, head on shot, of the suspect and the interrogator (in the suspect-
focused and interrogator-focused conditions respectively) and a close up profile shot that 
included both the suspect and the interrogator equally in the equal-focused condition.  It is 
possible that the camera perspective bias would be found if this study was replicated using a 
more optimal location with better quality video cameras.  
In support of the fourth hypothesis tested in Experiment 2, participants made more 
dispositional than situational attributions for suspects’ statements.  This finding is likely due to 
the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977, Gilbert et al., 1990; Jones and Harris, 1967).  In 
other words, participants underestimated the situational factors and overestimated the 
dispositional factors that may have led suspects to confess to or deny cheating.  It was also found 
that more dispositional attributions were made for suspects viewed when they were the focus of 
the camera than when the suspect and the participant were both the focus of the camera, and both 
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dispositional and situational attributions were made about equally for suspects when the 
interrogator was the focus of the camera.  These findings can be explained by the phenomenon of 
illusory causation (Taylor & Fiske).     
Several unexpected results were found regarding the gender of the suspect and guilt 
judgments.  One interesting finding was that the gender of the suspect was found to influence 
guilt judgments such that females were judged to be less innocent than male suspects overall.  
Furthermore, when the camera was focused on female suspects they were judged as more guilty 
when they confessed to cheating and more innocent when they denied cheating.  However, when 
male suspects confessed to cheating they were judged as more guilty when the camera focus was 
on both the suspect and the interrogator, but when they denied cheating they were judged as 
more innocent when the camera was focused on the suspect. 
The gender of the suspect may have influenced judgments of guilt because a limited 
number of videotaped interrogations were shown to participants.  Having only four videos of 
females and four videos of males leaves open the possibility that there were physical individual 
differences between the suspects that influenced guilt judgments.  Because female suspects’ 
statements were judged as the most valid when the female suspect could not be seen by the 
participant and male suspects’ statements were judged as the most valid when the male suspect 
could be seen by the participant, it is possible that participants were picking up on some physical 
individual differences that made them find the male suspects more trustworthy than the female 
suspects.  Although this explanation is only speculative, the current findings cannot be compared 
to previous research conducted by Russano et al. (2005) and Lassiter et al., manuscript in 
preparation (as cited in Snyder et al., 2009) because all of their videotaped confessions were of 
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males.  It is important to replicate the current studies using a larger number of videotaped 
interrogations. 
Three unexpected results were found that demonstrated that the gender of the suspects 
had an effect on the type and amount of attributions participants made for the suspects’ 
statements.  First, it was found that participants made more dispositional attributions for guilty 
females than for innocent females, however, the pattern for males was the exact opposite.  
Second, it was found that for both male and female suspects participants made both dispositional 
and situational attributions about equally when the camera was focused on the interrogator.  For 
both male and female suspects it was also found that participants made more dispositional 
attributions when the camera was focused on the suspect, a finding that is in accordance with the 
fundamental attribution error and illusory causation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975).  However, these 
findings were only significant for females.  Third, dispositional attributions were found to be 
more common for innocent females that denied cheating and situational attributions were more 
common for innocent females that confessed to cheating.  Additionally, there was not much 
difference between dispositional and situational attributions for guilty females that confessed to 
cheating and those that denied cheating.  However, this pattern was the exact opposite for males.  
In other words, dispositional attributions were more common for males that falsely denied 
cheating and for females that truly denied cheating, and situational attributions were more 
common for males that truly confessed to cheating and for females that falsely confessed to 
cheating. 
It is unclear at this time as to why gender was such an influential factor in the type and 
amount of attributions participants made for suspects’ statements.  It is probably too early to 
speculate as to the reasons behind these findings, however, it is possible that the difference in 
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patterns between male and female suspects was due to the limited number of videotaped 
interrogations, which allowed suspects’ individual differences to become a factor, as well.  It is 
reasonable to assume that individual differences between suspects would have a large impact on 
the type and amount of dispositional attributions participants made about the suspects. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 As with all research, the current studies are not without limitations.  One limitation to 
consider when evaluating the confession and denial rates in Experiment 1 is the fact that most 
undergraduate students would not experience the same consequences for confessing to a crime in 
a laboratory study as a suspect would in real life.  However, an attempt was made in Experiment 
1 to make some form of consequence explicit that would seem relatively large to an 
undergraduate student, namely committing academic dishonesty and facing departmental or 
university repercussions.   
 It is also important to note that the interrogators used in Experiment 1 were not police 
interrogators or trained actors.  While every attempt was made to keep the script during the 
interrogation in Experiment 1 identical across participants, it was not always feasible for the 
interrogators to do so.  Additionally, there may be things about the interrogators themselves, 
such as participants’ perceptions of the interrogators authority, warmth, compassion, friendliness, 
and so forth that contributed to the confession and denial rates found in Experiment 1, as well as 
to how participants viewed suspects’ statements in Experiment 2.   
 Finally, it should be noted that although the quality of the picture and sound were not 
ideal, the videos chosen for Experiment 2 included all aspects of the scene required, depending 
on condition, and both the suspect and interrogator could be clearly understood.  The placement 
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of the hidden cameras was largely determined by the constraints of the researcher’s laboratory 
space, and in some cases there were minor obstructions blocking the full view of the camera.  
Because of theses limitations, it is important to further conduct studies on confessions 
and interrogations both inside and outside the laboratory to better generalize these results to the 
court system.  Although, it has been well documented that it is possible to obtain a false 
confession in a laboratory setting, it is still unknown exactly how these findings would apply to 
actual jurors’ decisions about the validity of a confession.   
 Future research in this area might include actual jurors.  One possible way to do this 
would be to recruit adult participants that recently served jury duty on a case involving a 
confession.  Although not a precise measure by any means, simply asking jurors about their 
impressions of the confession, and whether they believed the defendant was guilty, may yield 
interesting and more ecologically valid findings.  
Additionally, future research could expand current knowledge on confessions and 
interrogations by including denials.  By comparing how individuals judge people that confess to 
a crime with individuals that deny committing a crime, it may be possible to identify the key 
factors that individuals are using to make guilt judgments.  For example, in the Experiment 2 it 
was found that simply confessing to a crime increased guilt ratings.  It would be possible to 
conduct a follow-up analysis of the responses participants gave in Experiment 2 as to the factors 
that led them to their conclusion about the guilt of the suspects and anything special that 
happened during the interrogation that may have led the suspect to confess to or deny cheating.  
It is possible that by analyzing the content of these responses we would uncover common themes 
amongst participants.  Furthermore, conducting this analysis on the responses for participants 
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that judged guilty suspects that denied cheated as innocent, may give some insight into how 
suspects deceive interrogators and jurors in general. 
Conclusion 
Due to the increase in felony exonerations based on DNA evidence, where a false 
confession was obtained, research on the reasons why people falsely confess is of great 
importance.  Individual differences interact with the social context of the interrogation, and in 
some cases result in a person confessing to a crime they did not commit.  The way in which a 
confession is presented to the judge and jury likely has an influence on how the confession is 
viewed.  
It is important for the criminal justice system, as well as the layperson, to know and 
understand why it is possible for a person to falsely confess.  The current research was conducted 
in order to determine when and why people confess to or deny committing crimes they are 
accused of, as well as to investigate the effects of camera perspective on ecologically valid 
videotaped confessions and denials.  The current findings further demonstrate that some 
proportion of people confess to crimes they did not commit, however, the camera perspective 
bias was not evident.  Future research needs to be conducted in order to generalize the current 
findings to true confessions and interrogations.  With enough research conducted on the matter it 
may be possible to reduce, if not eliminate, false confessions and false imprisonment based on 
those confessions. 
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Table 1 
 
Overall Means and Standard Deviations for Judgments of Guilt x Confidence. 
 Suspect 
(n= 47) 
Interrogator 
(n= 60) 
Equal 
(n= 59) 
Confession    
     Female    
          Guilty 2.68 (7.54) 3.23 (6.91) 2.97 (7.45) 
          Innocent -.06 (7.44) .60 (7.59) -3.07 (6.93) 
     Male    
          Guilty 2.94 (6.58) 3.48 (6.53) 3.53 (6.98) 
          Innocent -6.17 (4.92) -5.05 (5.72) -3.75 (6.71) 
Denial    
     Female    
          Guilty -2.77 (7.17) -3.70 (6.52) -2.49 (7.47) 
          Innocent -1.57 (7.60) -3.90 (6.97) -.75 (7.48) 
     Male    
          Guilty -2.43 (7.27) -2.33 (6.47) -1.58 (7.44) 
          Innocent -8.04 (3.51) -6.02 (5.45) -5.41 (6.72 
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Table 2 
 
Overall Means and Standard Deviations for the Differences Between Dispositional and 
Situational Attributions 
 
 Suspect 
(n= 47) 
Interrogator 
(n= 57) 
Equal 
(n= 48) 
Confession    
     Female    
          Guilty .26 (.61) .05 (.61) .21 (.71) 
          Innocent .15 (.69) -.39 (.68) .04 (.65) 
     Male    
          Guilty .04 (.59) -.23 (.69) -.17 (.81) 
          Innocent .28 (.65) .16 (.77) .12 (.70) 
Denial    
     Female    
          Guilty .26 (.74) -.07 (.70) .31 (.66) 
          Innocent .19 (.71) .19 (.72) .31 (.72) 
     Male    
          Guilty .40 (.68) .07 (.68) .31 (.69) 
          Innocent .30 (.69) .09 (.71) .08 (.65) 
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Figure 1. Mean judgments of guilt × confidence as a function of guilt and gender of the suspect.  
Positive values indicate guilt judgments and negative values indicate innocence judgments.  
Larger absolute values indicate higher confidence. 
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Figure 2. Mean judgments of guilt × confidence as a function of guilt and statement.  Positive 
values indicate guilt judgments and negative values indicate innocence judgments.  Larger 
absolute values indicate higher confidence. 
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Figure 3. Mean judgments of guilt × confidence as a function of statement, camera perspective, 
and gender of the suspect.  Positive values indicate guilt judgments and negative values indicate 
innocence judgments.  Larger absolute values indicate higher confidence. 
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Figure 4. Differences between dispositional and situational attributions as a function of gender of 
the suspect and guilt. Positive values indicate dispositional attributions were more common, 
negative values indicate that situational attributions were more common, and values close to zero 
indicate that dispositional and situational attributions were equally common.  
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Figure 5. Differences between dispositional and situational attributions as a function of gender of 
the suspect and camera perspective. Positive values indicate dispositional attributions were more 
common, negative values indicate that situational attributions were more common, and values 
close to zero indicate that dispositional and situational attributions were equally common. 
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Figure 6. Differences between dispositional and situational attributions as a function of gender of 
the suspect, guilt, and camera perspective. Positive values indicate dispositional attributions were 
more common, negative values indicate that situational attributions were more common, and 
values close to zero indicate that dispositional and situational attributions were equally common. 
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Appendix A 
         Date:___________ 
 
My name: ___________________  My partner’s name:____________________ 
 
Please fill in your name and your partner’s name, as well as today’s date at the top of the 
page.  For some problems you are to work alone, for others you are to work together on your 
answers.  Whether you are to work independently or with your partner is indicated after the letter 
you are given to use for the problem (e.g., LETTER P- PLEASE WORK INDEPENDENT).   
For the independent problems PLEASE DO NOT CONSULT EACH OTHER during these 
problems. 
 
Use the given letter to answer each of the following. They have to be real places, names, 
things.... nothing made up! You CAN'T use your name for the boy/girl name question. 
 
 
LETTER: A- PLEASE WORK TOGETHER 
 
 
4 LETTER WORD: ________________________ 
 
BOYS NAME: ________________________ 
 
GIRLS NAME: ________________________ 
 
OCCUPATION: ________________________ 
 
COLOR: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING YOU WEAR: ________________________ 
 
FOOD: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING FOUND IN A BATHROOM: ________________________ 
 
PLACE: ________________________ 
 
REASON FOR BEING LATE: ________________________ 
 
OFFICE ITEM: ________________________ 
 
TOOL: ________________________ 
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LETTER: W- PLEASE WORK INDEPENDENTLY   (Do NOT consult each other) 
 
 
SOMETHING YOU SHOUT: ________________________ 
 
GAME: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING FOUND IN A BACKYARD: ________________________ 
 
VACATION PLACE: ________________________ 
 
WEDDING GIFT: ________________________ 
 
VEHICLE: ________________________ 
 
CITY: ________________________ 
 
CARTOON CHARACTER: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING YOU WEAR: ________________________ 
 
CELEBRITY: ________________________ 
 
BEVERAGE: ________________________ 
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LETTER: S- PLEASE WORK TOGETHER 
 
 
ANIMAL: ________________________ 
 
T.V. SHOW: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING YOU FIND ON A FARM: ________________________ 
 
COUNTRY: ________________________ 
 
SONG WITH A PERSON’S NAME IN THE TITLE: ________________________ 
 
DOG BREED: ________________________ 
 
FRUIT: ________________________ 
 
BAND WITH A ONE WORD NAME: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING ASSOCIATED WITH AMERICA: ________________________ 
 
MYTHICAL CREATURE/MONSTER: ________________________ 
 
ACTOR/ACTRESS: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING THAT MAKES YOU ITCH: ________________________ 
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LETTER: P- PLEASE WORK INDEPENDENTLY (Do NOT consult each other) 
 
 
MATH TERM: ________________________ 
 
COLD DRINK: ________________________ 
 
BOOK AUTHOR: ________________________ 
 
PHOTOGRAPHY TERM OR EQUIPMENT: ________________________ 
 
SPORT: ________________________ 
 
TYPE OF FURNITURE: ________________________ 
 
KITCHEN APPLICANCE: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING TERRIFYING: ________________________ 
 
MEDICAL TERM/MEDICINE: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING THAT SMELLS BAD: ________________________ 
 
SOMETHING PEOPLE PAY A LOT FOR: ________________________ 
 
CAR PART: ________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME! 
 
